Practical Ethics 2

March 10, 2016

EthicsA couple of weeks ago I posted Practical Ethics discussing the undue reliance governments and others  place on other people’s ethics, Through naivety, undue optimism, or laziness, they set up situations based on blind trust in the ethical standards of others which have resulted in deaths, injury and the loss of $billions.

In this post I want to look inside an organisation and discuss reason why Determining the ethics of the organisation is at #2 in my Six Functions of Governance and Creating the culture of the organisation is at #3.  #1 in the list is Determining the objectives of the organisation.

The underlying approach I’ve taken, founded in stakeholder theory, is the presumption that the best way to achieve an organisation’s objectives is to work with the organisation’s full spectrum of stakeholders so they contribute to the success of the organisation and everyone benefits. This requires a strong ethical foundation and an outwardly focused culture. The role of the governing body is to set the objectives and create the organisation’s culture and ethics, the role of management is to work within this framework to achieve the objectives. Whilst many aspects of governance can be delegated to a degree, setting the ethical standards of the organisation in particular is non-transferable. It starts and stops at the top – with the governing body.

The ethical standards of an organisation are created in two ways:

  • The way the organisation’s leaders act;
  • The ethical standards the leaders are prepared to tolerate in their subordinates.

This post will look at both of these aspects, using the example of the current scandal surrounding Comminsure (the insurance arm of the CBA bank) to highlight their importance – see more on the scandal.

 

Leaders set the standard.

Generally speaking, the top managers in an organisation create a ceiling on ethical behaviours. Leaders at the next level down tend to be rated lower than their managers on every leadership dimension including their honesty and integrity, many may rate equally but it is very rare to find a subordinate acting more ethically than the organisation’s leaders (for more on this see Ethical Leadership).

The key here is the word ‘act’ – leaders set the ethical standards of the organisation by their actions, not their statements. It more than ‘walking-the-talk’, talking is almost irrelevant.

One glaring examples from the Comminsure scandal will serve to demonstrate the issue.  The CBA’s CEO said that he placed a high value on transparency and open communication; this included both encouraging and protecting ‘whistleblowers’ within the bank. A commendable and highly ethical position; and from a practical perspective essential for the minimisation of wrong doing in a workforce of 55,000.

However, actions speak louder than words! In November 2014 the chief medical officer of Comminsure, Dr Benjamin Koh, disclosed his concerns over “an improper state of affairs” concerning aspects of Comminsure’s business to key independent directors at Comminsure including the chairman Geoff Austin. Two months later Comminsure began to investigate Dr Koh and he was sacked by the managing director of Comminsure, Helen Troup, for ‘misconduct’, in August 2015. He is now suing Comminsure and the CBA for unfair dismissal.

The appearance is that the bank’s management won’t fire you for whistle blowing but they will find some other excuse. The bank virtually admits as much, in this statement which states: “Commonwealth Bank encourages all employees to speak up if they see activities or behaviours that are fraudulent, illegal or inconsistent with our values. We provide a number of different safeguards to ensure that there are no negative consequences for raising concerns. We have thanked Dr Koh for raising concerns that led to the CMLA Board conducting a review. Dr Koh’s employment was not terminated for raising concerns. It was terminated primarily for serious and repeated breaches of customers’ privacy and trust involving highly sensitive personal, medical and financial information over a lengthy period of time.”  What they fail to mention was one of major issues raised by Dr. Koh was the manipulation, alteration and loss of information from the records he is accused of mishandling.

The perception may be incorrect, but to anyone looking on from outside of the organisation it would seem the person running Comminsure preferred to sack a whistleblower rather than deal with the problems he raised.

The CEO and the Directors of CBA can talk until they are blue in the face about the ‘ethical standards’ they purport to uphold, their actions speak louder. The person running Comminsure and responsible for the issues raised by Dr. Koh is still in her role, the ‘whistleblower’ is out of a job. If the board really meant what is says, the whistleblower would have been protected and the manager attacking him disciplined. Everyone else in CBA will clearly understand the message.

It really does not matter what the final outcome of all of this is; the actions of CBA and Comminsure management have made it clear to every one of their 55,000 staff that if you raise concerns within the banks ‘whistleblower’ processes you will be fired!

Given this perception, is it any wonder that the leaders of the CBA seem to be continually in the dark about what’s really going on in their organisation……..  Unfortunately for those in governance role not knowing is not an excuse.

 

Tolerating unethical behaviour.

Ethics2The second plank underpinning an ethical organisation is the degree of unethical behaviour it is prepared to tolerate. If an organisation is prepared to tolerate a person increasing his or her bonus by not paying out an insurance claim to a dying person for 3 or 4 years, everyone else in the organisation will understand the acceptable level of behaviour.

Comminsure has been shown to have withheld legitimate payments to claimants for years to boost profits and bonuses (only rectified after the national broadcast was imminent).  As far as I can tell everyone responsible from the managing director down are still in their jobs.

Previously the CBA was shown, courtesy of a Senate enquiry, to have misrepresented information to clients and falsified documents.  Again, most of the people responsible still work for the CBA and the ethical benchmark has been determined by this fact.

If the behaviours were ethically unacceptable people would be fired or moved into roles where they cannot adversely affect customer’s lives. The fact most people are still in their roles and still have their bonus payments from previous years indicates to everyone the CBA believes these behaviours are ethically acceptable and will continue to reward people for placing profits ahead of customers (see The normalisation of deviant behaviours). Management’s actions speak far louder then PR announcements and so called ‘public apologies’ that only eventuate after adverse national publicity.

 

Culture

Culture is ‘the way we do thing around here’ – one of the key elements of culture is the ethical standards people see as ‘normal’; another is the learned experience of how to behave within the organisation. As outlined above these settings are very different from the rhetoric.

But, ethics and culture are always shades of grey; the CBA’s culture is clearly flawed if the bank claims to be concerned about its customers. However, if the CBA is really only concerned with short-term profits, the culture, ethics and PR spin may be appropriate. In the last 6 months, the CBA achieved a remarkable return on equity of above 17 per cent, and a $4.8 billion half-year profit. And, despite the scandal, its shares have increased in price today. The cost is the damaged lives of some of its customers; the unresolved question is what are the acceptable limits? Maybe a Royal Commission will let everyone know.

Legal implications aside, the challenge facing the CBA is that changing culture and ethical standards is a massively difficult task and the people who created and thrive in the current culture are unlikely to be willing participants in changing it.  There’s no easy answer to this dilemma.

 

Conclusion

The real measure of an organisation’s ethical standards are set by the way people behave when no one is looking on – there will always be mistakes and unethical actions by a few, others within the organisation will correct these deviations and being behaviours back inside the culturally acceptable norms of behaviour of the organisation. This has undoubtedly been occurring within CBA and Comminsure on a daily basis, unacceptable behaviours will have been corrected or sanctioned; desired behaviours rewarded. What’s acceptable and unacceptable is determined by the culture of the organisation and its ethical standards.

The ethical standards of an organisation are set by the actions of its leaders. What they do themselves sets the ceiling and what they tolerate in others the floor. The rest of the people in an organisation will generally find a position between these two limits and the culture of the organisation will adapt to see this level of ethical behaviour as acceptable. The problem the governors and leaders of the CBA face is the simple fact that changing the ethics and culture of an established organisation is extremely difficult.


Does organisational governance exist?

November 8, 2015

Governance99Governance and governing have historically was associated with the role of the Sovereign governing his (or occasionally her) ‘sovereign state’. Over the last five or six centuries the exclusive power of the Sovereign has largely been devolved to governments of one form or another but the functions of making laws, authorising the collection of taxes and providing direction to the citizens of the state remain fundamentally unchanged.

The concept of corporate (or organisational) governance grew out of this overarching concept; to imply there was a similar role within an organisation for a ‘governing body’ to take responsibility for the governance of the organisation. This concept of a governing body setting the ‘rules’ by which an organisation operates and providing guidance on the organization’s objectives has many parallels with the functions of a government.  A government may choose to declare war on another country and provide resources and directions to its military but, at least for the last 2 or 3 centuries, governments have learned not to interfere in the actual conduct of the military campaigns – fighting the war is the responsibility of the professional military. Similarly the governing body of an organisation can set the objectives for the organisation and define the rules by which members of the organisation should operate but is wise to refrain from becoming actively involved in managing the actual work.

The paramount reason for separating governance and management is the simple fact it is almost impossible to take an objective view of work you are actively involved in! With these thoughts in mind, I started to consider the functions and purpose of governance to contrast with the functions and purpose of management.

The functions of management were quite easy to define, the work was done 100 years ago by Henri Fayol in his 1916 book Administration Industrielle et Generale, while there has been some academic argument about the syntax of Fayol’s five functions of management, they have basically stood the test of time. These are outlined in The Functions of Management.

Defining the functions of governance was much more difficult. Almost all of the standard texts describing governance either define:

  • The objectives of ‘good governance’; for example Cadbury’s ‘holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals’;
  • The principles of ‘good governance’; for example the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004 and the 2015 update); or
  • Elements of defined or required practice such as the ASX listing rules and the AICD Governance framework.

None of these sources actually describe what the governing body does or the extent of the governance processes within an organisation.  These are the questions I’ve been focusing on for the last couple of years.

The functions of governance have been described in The Functions of Governance, so far there has been no significant disagreement, that I’m aware of, that would indicate the need for change.  The functions of governance are also mapped to the functions of management and suggest a clear difference in purpose between governance and management that can be summarised as ‘governance sets the objectives and rules for the organisation, management works within the rules to achieve the objectives’.  A closely coupled, symbiotic relationship.

The responsibility for governance seems to be clearly defined by law makers and regulatory authorities.  The governing body is held accountable for the actions of the organisation it governs; this is the Board of Directors in most commercial organisations, in others the person, group or entity accountable for the performance and conformance of the organisation.

Having established the functions of management and governance, the fundamental question posed in this post is does organisational governance exists as a separate entity or is it simply an extension of ‘good management’.  To a degree this is a ‘chicken and egg’ problem.  Does the functioning of an effective governing body lead to ‘good management’ or does ‘good management’ embody the elements of good governance as an integral element in the overall functions of management (ie, Fayol’s five functions need expanding to include governance).

The consequence of the first option is the presences of a governing body which has as its primary function the oversight of the organisation’s management.  The consequence of the second is so-called ‘governing bodies’ such as a Board of Directors, are in effect simply the first, and most senior level of management.

There are a lot of writings that suggest the second option is at least considered viable by many commentators.  This month’s magazine published by the Australian Institute of Company Directors  contained a number of articles on ‘cloud technology’ and ‘big data’ suggesting Directors should be making management decisions on a daily basis based on current sales information, etc.  Similarly there are numerous publications describing various mid-to-low level management committees such as project steering committees as ‘governing bodies’ responsible for the ‘governance of’ a project. However, a project steering committee is in essence no different to any other management committee responsible for overseeing the work of a management entity; therefore under this scenario, every management committee responsible for the oversight of a management function is a ‘governing body’. The consequence of this line of argument is the proposition that governance and management are integral and there is no significant difference in the entities that undertake the work. Every level of management from the Board down is responsible for delivering good management which incorporates governance.

The alternate view based largely in corporate regulations and laws suggests the functions and responsibilities the governing body and its management team are discrete and different. The governing body (singular) represents the owners of the organisation and is responsible for governing the organisation to achieve sustained superior performance. The governing body accomplishes this by:

  • Defining the objectives of the organisation;
  • Determining the desired ethical, cultural and other standards they expect the organisation to work within (‘the rules’);
  • Appointing management to accomplish the objectives, working within ‘the rules’; and then
  • Ensuring the conformance and performance of their management and the organisation as a whole.

The primary advantage of this approach to governance is the functions of management are separated from the functions of governance. It is virtually impossible to have an impartial view of the work you are engaged in and one of the key responsibilities of the governing body is to oversight the performance of its management; the law says so!

Therefore, I suggest good governance requires a clear separation of the management and governance functions for no other reason than the need for the governing body to be able to objectively oversight the performance of it management. But this raises practical issues.

It is virtually impossible for the governing body to meaningfully oversight the work of 100s of managers and 1000s of staff, contractors and suppliers. Some aspects of governance have to be delegated to the management body.  This requires the following:

  • A carefully designed governance framework. Roles, responsibilities, decision limits and escalation paths need to be defined.
  • Clear rules for managers to follow in the performance of their management responsibilities. Managers should be personally responsible for following ‘the rules’ and for ensuring the people they manage follow ‘the rules’. Complying with, and conforming to, the objectives, ethics and culture of the organisation should be a condition of employment and a clearly defined management responsibility.
  • Ensuring any governance function is separated from the management function being governed. Assurance and conformance cannot be in the same place as management responsibility for performance. For example, a project steering committee should be responsible for providing direction and support to the project management team to ensure the performance of the project and the achievement of the project’s objectives (a management function) – ensuring conformance with ‘the rules’ is also part of this management responsibility. Assurance that these objectives have been achieved is a governance function that has to sit in a separate reporting line. In many organisations the PMO may be the entity tasked with this responsibility.

However, while the governing body by necessity has to devolve aspects of its responsibilities to people and entities within the overall management structure, the governing body remains responsible for the design of the governance framework and accountable to the organisation’s owners and other external stakeholder for the performance and conformance of the organisation and the validity of any assurances provided by the organisation to regulatory authorities.

 

So where does this leave questions such as the use of ‘big data and ‘the cloud’? I would suggest the responsibility of the governing body is to understand the technologies sufficiently to be able to set sensible objectives and ethical parameters for the organisation’s management to work within and then to ensure their management are working to achieve these objectives. It is no more the responsibility of the governing body to ‘manage big data and use it to make decisions on a daily basis’ than it is the responsibility of a steering committee to ‘govern’ a project. The responsibility of the governing body is to govern; the responsibility of a management committee is to manage.

This concept of separate functions and focus is not intended to imply an antagonistic relationship. In the same way every high performance soccer team blends people with different skills and responsibilities into a tight unit, a goal keeper needs very different capabilities to a striker; a high performance organisation needs a blend of capabilities: effective governance, effective management and committed staff. Certainly members of a performing team support each other and will help to correct deficiencies and errors by others within the team (high performance organisations are no different); but if the team start to mix up the skills and responsibilities the overall team performance will suffer (the consequences of steering committees pretending to be governance bodies is discussed in a 2012 post Management -v- Governance).

 

In conclusion, the answer to the opening question is YES, I believe governance and management are different and their functions are different:

A high performance organisation that is capable of achieving sustained superior performance combines both governance and management in a clearly delineated governance framework, supported by a clearly delineated management structure.


Governance and ethics

October 10, 2015

Lost valueBack in June I posted on Governance and Stakeholders focusing on the damage institutions were doing to their stakeholders through on-going governance failures.  Two of the organisations discussed (not for the first time) were the CBA Bank’s ongoing financial advice crisis and FIFA’s corruption, both on-going scandals.

Press articles over the last few days show neither of these problems is being well managed from either the institutions’ perspective or their customers’/stakeholders’ perspectives. The on-going sagas suggest the root cause of the problems is very much a governance failure, but in areas not previously discussed.

The Six Functions of Governance are:

  1. Determining the objectives of the organisation;
  2. Determining the ethics of the organisation;
  3. Creating the culture of the organisation;
  4. Designing and implementing the governance framework for the organisation;
  5. Ensuring accountability by management;
  6. Ensuring compliance by the organisation.

This post will demonstrate the importance of functions 2 and 3.

Starting with FIFA: the stated objective of FIFA is to further the development of soccer (football) world-wide. A noble objective!  However, to a large extent the culture and ethics within FIFA have become focused on individuals obtaining and retaining personal power for the benefit of the ‘powerful person’ – they may believe they are the best possible person for the job, but the evidence suggests otherwise! The use of FIFA’s resources by people in power to achieve this end has already been well documented and whilst of themselves these actions are not necessarily wrong, they have certainly led to a number of high profile prosecutions for corruption. I would suggest the ethical breakdown was driven by the toxic culture focused on achieving and retaining power.

This type of problem is well understood in many similar organisations that I’m familiar with, where there has been a focused effort by the governing body to create a culture of service to the membership / stakeholders.  This has been achieved by placing strict limits on the amount of time any one person can occupy a position of power. Generally there’s a ‘leadership chain’ of one or two ‘vice presidents’ and then the president.  People on this chain have one year terms in each position and move up the ladder progressively (elections are for the lowest ‘rung’ on the ladder).  Similarly, members of the governing body can serve a maximum of two terms of two years and a minimum of 25% of the ‘board’ positions are up for election each year.

This type of governance framework provides both continuity and renewal, and discourages people seeking power for themselves.  Anyone interested in seizing ‘power’ for 10 to 20 years will go elsewhere and find another organisation to participate in. This continual renewal process ensures there are always new ideas and new sets of eyes to ‘see’ any problems that are emerging, balanced by experience to maintain the longer term objective of the organisation. Ethical standards, competency and other matters remain important within a governance framework focused on facilitating the organisation’s objectives.

It will be interesting to see if the inevitable changes in FIFA will move in this direction and then if they use their funding power to drive similar changes through the regional and national organisations. If there’s no structural change, there will be no lasting change in the governance culture and consequently in the culture of the whole organisation.

CBAThe second focus is the CBA bank. Culture is also an issue in the way the CBA bank is treating the people damaged by the toxic culture it encourages in its wealth management division.  The basic rule for dealing with a failure (particularly of this magnitude) is ‘own-up then fix-up’. You need to acknowledge the error and take appropriate actions to rectify the mistake.

The causes of the problems were structural, and are discussed in The normalisation of deviant behaviours, but it took a Senate enquiry to drag a reluctant acknowledgement of the error.  To avoid sanctions, the CBA also agreed to set up a ‘high profile’ unit to compensate the victims of its wealth management advice.  After many months virtually no-one has been compensated and the bank’s approach would appear to be parsimonious at best.

The ‘fix-up’ part of dealing with a problem requires quick and generous restitution as far as is possible. This is relatively easy where then primary loss is financial but runs counter to the bank’s demonstrated culture of not really admitting error accompanied by short-term monetarism.

A quick and generous solution would be to frame a simple calculation and make an offer. The CBA knows how much money was ‘brought to the table’ by their victims, they can easily calculate what that would be worth now if the bank had advised the people to invest in bank term deposits and  they know the value of the money actually returned to the people. A couple of weeks with a decent spreadsheet and everyone could have received a reasonable offer.  There may be a need to add in some costs incurred in fighting for the victims rights and for other losses and damage but the whole problem could be largely resolved by now.

The cost of this type of option will be insignificant compared to the less obvious but real costs associated with the wages and costs associated with the bureaucratic monster the bank has created, the massive on-going damage to the bank’s reputation and ‘brand capital’ and the contingent liabilities for further legal actions and/or government action driven by the bank’s approach to this problem.

I’m not sure how the logic of the bank’s assessment processes are structured but a report in the press this week that some people had only been offered a fee refund highlights an approach focused on minimising payouts rather then solving the problem.  If advice was so bad a refund of the fees paid for the advice is warranted, the advice was bad and liability for the damage it caused would appear to sit with the bank??

How you change the culture in an institution as big as the CBA from a parsimonious focus on paying out money to maximise short-term profits is a challenge of the CBA Board, but if they fail, sooner or later the CBA will fail because its stakeholder community will decide to do business elsewhere.  Just because you are big does not mean you are invulnerable.

Conclusion.

The first three elements in the six functions of governance are there for a reason.  Obviously the objectives of the organisation are its reason for existing and have to come first. Then the governing body has to do the hard work of developing the right set of ethics and the right culture within the organisation’s (making sure its governance framework supports the desired culture) before anything else can really occur. As FIFA in particular demonstrates, failure in these critical aspects of an organisation tarnish everything else is touches.

It is impossible to achieve a ‘customer centric’, stakeholder aware organisation if the culture is focused on power or short-term profits!


The Elements of Stakeholder Engagement

July 20, 2015

Effective stakeholder engagement is a two-way interactive relationship that encourages stakeholder involvement in the organisation for the benefit of both the stakeholders and the organisation.  The trend is increasingly clear; organisations that effectively serve the needs of their stakeholders outperform those that do not.

However, what is also apparent is confusion on the part of many managers as to precisely what stakeholder engagement is, and what systems facilitate effective stakeholder engagement.  This post suggests there are three basic systems that together form the foundation for effective stakeholder engagement in most organisations, but the foundations are just that, necessary underpinnings, stakeholder engagement itself rises above the foundations to create an entirely new way of engaging with stakeholders. Let’s start with a look at the three basic components:

Stakeholder Engagement

PR = Public Relations

PR is probably the oldest of the three foundations (particularly if you include advertising within the overall ambit of PR).  For thousands of years people and organisations with something to sell to ‘the public’ have recognised the need to tell potential customers about their offering and suggest there is a good reason for the potential customer to become an actual customer or client.

Camel Market

Smart merchants realised they needed to give potential customers a reason for doing business with them (rather than someone else) and that competing on price alone was not a good move in a crowded market place.

The role of advertising is in part to make potential customers aware of your offering and in part to create a desire for the type of goods or services you are providing. Effective advertising creates a ‘call to action’ which the customer heeds.

Public Relations (PR) has a different focus.  Good PR is built around creating a positive image of the organisation in the minds of its wider stakeholder community. PR is not directly aligned to sales in the way advertising is, but does seek to make the organisation appear to be one that most stakeholders in its target audience will want to be associated with.  This may be because of exclusivity, or status, because the organisation is seen to be ‘good’, or for any one of a dozen other reasons.  Effective PR has many purposes including:

  • Underpinning its advertising by creating a ‘good first impression’ of the organisation, thereby allowing the stakeholder to take note of its advertising.
  • Explaining the value of the organisation to a wider community minimising resistance to the functioning of the organisation and facilitating its operations.
  • Making the organisation appear to be a desirable ‘citizen’ within its community; etc.

Good PR is of course authentic and reflective of the true nature of the organisation, in the modern age ‘spin’ is easily uncovered and can be very damaging.

The fundamental nature of both PR and advertising is ‘push’ communication – the organisation pushes its message out to the wider community, hopes someone listens, and then measures its impact after the event with a view to improving the ‘message’ and the effect.

 

CRM = Customer Relationship Management

CRM is focused on providing a great experience to every customer.  The commercial driver for CRM is in part the generally accepted fact that it is far cheaper to retain an existing customer then to attract a new one and in part from a win-win view that the ability to quickly and efficiently service the unique needs of each customer reduces the transaction costs for the organisation.

Customers or clients are clearly stakeholders with a significant interest in the organisation, so focusing effort on providing them with the best possible level of service, delivered quickly and efficiently is a win-win outcome. Happy customers are more likely to recommend an organisation to their friends and colleagues as well as becoming regular clients of the organisation.

Unfortunately the concept of CRM seems to have been hijacked by software systems, overseas call centres and ‘big data’; bought with a view to ‘reducing costs’.  There’s nothing wrong with any of these concepts provided the outcome is improved customer service. Where the outcome is a reduction in service, any cost savings are likely to be offset by reduced business and the cost of attracting new customers to replace the ones lost by poor service.

Whilst CRM at its best is interactive and focused on a win-win outcome for both the organisation and its stakeholders, the stakeholders directly affected by CRM are limited to the organisations customers and clients.

 

Stakeholder Management

Stakeholder management is process focused; it involves planned interaction with a wider stakeholder community, both to manage the consequences of any crisis as well as providing information and facilitating two-way communication with key stakeholders.

Good stakeholder management is a proactive process, focused on facilitating regular communication and anticipating needs, issues and problems that are likely to arise within the stakeholder community. Tools and methodologies such as the Stakeholder Circle® are designed to facilitate efficient stakeholder management. Stakeholders are identified, there needs assesses and their relative importance determined. Based on this assessment, communication and other interactions are initiated to gather the support and assistance needed by the organisation and to head off or minimise any threats or problems.

The focus of stakeholder management tends to be ‘defensive’, and is aimed at creating the best possible stakeholder environment to allow the organisation to do its work efficiently   The process is interactive, seeking to engage constructively with the organisations stakeholders and looking for win-win outcomes that benefit the organisation and the stakeholder, but is driven by the organisation, from the perspective of the organisation.

 

Stakeholder Engagement

Stakeholder engagement builds on these three foundations (particularly ‘stakeholder management’) to create a different paradigm.  Stakeholders are encouraged to actively engage with the organisation and contribute to its growth and development whilst at the same time the organisation and its staff engage with their community through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives and the like. These engagement processes build a strong, two-way relationship in which the stakeholders and the organisation work together to build a common future that is both mutually desirable and beneficial.  I will be writing about stakeholder engagement in a future post.

 

Conclusion

The three foundations of Stakeholder Engagement: ‘Stakeholder Management’, CRM and PR are quite different processes focused on achieving different outcomes.  In a well managed organisation all three functions work together to crate a supportive stakeholder environment and a successful organisation. However, whilst the systems need to be aligned and compatible they are very different and should not be confused.

In particular CRM and Stakeholder Management systems have very different objectives, focus on quite different stakeholder groupings, need significantly different information sets, and have very different measures of success:

  • CRM focuses on customers (or clients). Whilst customers as a ‘class’ of stakeholder are important, generally an individual customer is not. The focus of a CRM system is managing large amounts of data to provide ‘all customers’ with a generically ‘good’, potentially ‘tailored’ experience.
  • Stakeholder Management focuses on indentifying the key stakeholders ‘at this point in time’ that require specific management focus as well as the wider group of stakeholders that need to be engaged (or at least watched). In most situations very few individual clients or customers would be sufficiently important to feature in this list, but there will be lots of stakeholders who are highly unlikely to ever become ‘customers’, for example suppliers and competitors.

The shift to ‘stakeholder engagement’ does not add new systems but does require a paradigm shift in thinking. The key element of stakeholder engagement is opening up to the ‘right stakeholders’ and either inviting them into the organisation, or reaching out to them, to help create a mutually beneficial future – more on this later.

 

 

 


Governance and stakeholders

June 7, 2015

CrisisBoth stakeholder theory and the modern concept of organisational governance place importance on the organisation fulfilling the needs of all of its stakeholders. The older, generally discredited ‘stockholder’ theory suggested the primary purpose of an organisation was to maximise value for its owners – generally interpreted by those in power as looking after the short-term interests of ‘those in power’ or the few with a direct investment in the organisation.

Three on-going sagas demonstrate the fallacy of taking a short term ‘stockholder’ approach to creating value.

1. The FIFA Crisis: Ignoring the alleged criminality of many of the key actors, my view is the biggest ‘governance failure’ in FIFA for the last decade or more has been the perceived method of allocating development funds to national soccer authorities.  The perception is that most of these funds were distributed at the behest of Sepp Blatter, and therefore if the associations wanted to keep on receiving their development funding they needed to vote for Blatter.

There is nothing wrong with funding the development of the game – it is one of FIFA’s primary objectives.  The governance breakdown was in the lack of a robust and transparent process for allocating the money to soccer associations that could make the most beneficial use of the funds and requiring accountability for the expenditure. The $billions in largely unaccounted largess distributed on a less than transparent basis is I suspect the root cause of much of the evil besetting FIFA at the present time.

Its too early to determine the damage to both FIFA and the game of soccer (football) from the breakdown in governance but one thing is already very clear, the big loser over the last decade has been the game, its players and its supporters – ultimately the stakeholders who really matter.

2. The on-going Banking Crisis: The focus of banks on employing and rewarding greedy people focused on maximising their bonuses at the expense of the Banks customers and shareholders lead to the financial crisis and a series of other failures, reviews and prosecutions in the USA, UK and Australia at least.

In Australia, the governance failure was senior managers and the Board’s Directors putting short-term profits ahead of the long term development of the bank. Front line sales people were paid to sell inappropriate products to clients – they do not get bonuses for not selling product even if it is in the best interest of the client.  Middle managers were paid to ignore potential problems – their KPIs and bonuses were driven by the sales volumes of their staff, etc.

The banks and their stockholders did very well for a while, now many of the problems created by this governance and cultural failure are starting to emerge, the short term stock speculators are taking their profits and dumping bank stocks.  Trust in the banking system is at an all time low (financial advisers are deemed less trustworthy then politicians). Very few of the stakeholders in the baking industry, including employees, long term investors,  clients or governments are on the ‘winning side’.  I’m waiting to see what game changing ‘disruptive innovation’ emerges – anyone offering a viable alternative to the banks has a once-in-a-lifetime window of opportunity to start up in a market looking for a viable alternative to ‘big banks’.

3. The on-going Child Abuse Crisis: The Australian Government’s Royal Commission into child abuse continues to uncover major breakdowns in governance in a vast range of organisations. The thing I find most upsetting is the abject failure of the leadership in most of these organisations to uphold the values of the organisation.  Abuse was ignored, covered up, secret payments made to ‘settle complaints’, etc.  The focus of the various churches, school and other institutional leaders was always a short term attempt to protect the institution from ‘bad publicity’. Hide the perpetrators of the evil and diminish the claims of the abused children (causing even more distress and harm).

The long term damage this short-sighted policy of ‘cover-up’ and ‘look-the-other-way’ will cause to the churches in particular has yet to emerge but I suspect there will be massive consequences that damage both the institution and the people the institutions serve, their congregations.

Summary

In each of these cases, the governance failure started at the very top of the organisation, the Executive Committee, Directors, and Bishops failed to develop a culture focused on achieving good outcomes for all of the respective organisation’s stakeholders and allowed corrupt cultures to develop focused on advantaging a very select group of ‘stockholders’.  The resulting crises will be causing damage to the organisations and their stakeholders for decades to come. Unfortunately in the vast majority of cases the people responsible for the breakdown of governance in their organisation are still hanging on to their jobs and pretending the failures are the fault of people lower down the organisational hierarchy.

Avoiding this type of problem is not easy but it starts with the governing bodies recognising that they, and they alone, can set the cultural and ethical tone for an organisation. The functions of governance outlined in our White Paper may seem soft and fuzzy concepts but if they are not implemented effectively and rigorously the next crisis will only be a matter of time. Long term success can only be assured by governing for all stakeholders, which in turn requires an ethical framework and a culture that demands transparency and accountability (as well as technical excellence) from everyone working in the organisations hierarchy.


The Functions of Governance

November 15, 2014

We have published 3 papers recently that clarify and differentiate the functions of management and the functions of governance.

The widely accepted ‘functions of management’ developed by Henri Fayol and published in his 1916 book Administration Industrielle et Generale, are summarised in: WP1094 The Functions of Management. Fayol’s ‘functions of management are:

  • M1 – To forecast and plan,
  • M2 – To organise
  • M3 – To command or direct (lead)
  • M4 – To coordinate
  • M5 – To control (French: contrôller: in the sense that a manager must receive feedback about a process in order to make necessary adjustments and must analyse the deviations.).

These functions are to be contrasted with my Six Functions of Governance:

  • G1 – Determining the objectives of the organisation
  • G2 – Determining the ethics of the organisation
  • G3 – Creating the culture of the organisation
  • G4 – Designing and implementing the governance framework for the organisation
  • G5 – Ensuring accountability by management
  • G6 – Ensuring compliance by the organisation

The mapping of the relationship between the functions of management and the functions of governance are set out below:

Mapping of the functions

Management functions are assumed to be hierarchal with the governance inputs cascading down to lower level functions.

Management functions are assumed to be hierarchal with the governance inputs cascading down to lower level functions.

These functions of governance were initially proposed in my ‘advisory article’: The Six Functions of Governance. Published in PM World Journal Vol. III, Issue XI – November 2014; download from here.

A more focused discussion paper has been published today in WP1096 The Functions of Governance.

Conclusion

Governance is the action of governing an organisation by using and regulating influence to direct and control the actions and affairs of management and others. It is the exclusive responsibility of the ‘governing body’, the person, or group accountable for the performance and conformance of the organisation (in a commercial organisation, the Board of Directors).

But in many situations, particularly associated with the governance of project and programs, the governing of organisations is far from effective. The amount of time and effort devoted by the ‘governing body’ to compliance and accountability, and the amount of resources wasted by ineffective and ‘competing’ management groups, can be significantly reduced if the organisation’s objectives, ethics and culture are sound.

Six core functions of governance are defined to bridge the gap between the ‘objectives of governance’ defined by Cadbury and others and the practices of governance defined by organisations such as the AICD. Hopefully discussion around the core functions of governance sparked by these papers will encourage improved governance performance.


Stakeholders generate profits for shareholders

October 29, 2014

A few months ago I posted on the concept of Understanding stakeholder theory and suggested organisations that focus on providing value to stakeholders do better than those focused on short term rewards for shareholders and the associated benefits flowing to executive bonuses.

A new report: From the stockholder to the stakeholder by Arabseque Asset Management and Oxford University supports this contention.

From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder reviews existing research on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. It is a meta-study of over 190 different sources the authors have demonstrated a strong correlation between organizations that take ESG seriously and economic performance. For example:

  • 90% of relevant studies show that sound sustainability standards lower the cost of capital;
  • 88% of relevant studies show a positive correlation between sustainability and operational performance;
  • 80% of relevant studies show a positive correlation between sustainability and financial market performance.

However, to translate superior ESG quality into competitive advantage, sustainability must be deeply rooted in an organisation’s culture and values. The consequences of failing to take ESG seriously continues to be demonstrated by another of my regular topics, BP. The report contains a plot of oil company share prices from 2009 (pre the Deepwater horizon disaster) through to 2014. BP’s share price continues to suffer the consequences of the short sighted cost cutting that precipitated the Gulf of Mexico disaster:

BP-Price

The report concludes that it is in the best economic interests of corporate managers and investors to incorporate ESG considerations into decision-making processes starting at the governance level right down the organisation hierarchy.

The full report can be downloaded from  http://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/pdf/Stockholder_to_Stakeholder.pdf.